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Abstract 
This is the first of three articles that attempts to repurpose an exegeti-
cal/hermeneutical methodology primarily designed for the study of the 
biblical text, with a view toward analyzing a particular cultural scene in 
West Java, Indonesia. By doing so, I attempt to illustrate the way in 
which methods in theological hermeneutics can cast light upon cultural 
hermeneutics. In this first installment, I take a close look at the narra-
tive (as opposed to propositional) nature of all knowledge and know-
ing. I also illustrate that narrative nature by way of a look at a well-
known anthropological methodology, one with its own strengths and 
weaknesses. The weaknesses of this methodology will offer to us space 
for suggesting an alternative in future installments. 
 
Key Terms: anthropology, theology, ethnography, social and cultural 
anthropology, hermeneutics, biblical studies, cultural anthropology, 
and biblical hermeneutics 
 
Introduction 
 
We are a meaning-seeking species, a simple realization that carries with 
it substantial implications. I unpack a few of these in this series of ar-
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ticles on hermeneutics and the quest for a widened application of Rob-
ert A. Traina’s interpretive methodology. Bruce J. Malina gets us 
started with this observation: 
 
All human beings carry on an interpretive enterprise. As a rule, 
people carry in their heads one or more models of “society” and 
“human being” which greatly influence what they look for in their 
experiences, what they actually see, and what they eventually do 
with their observations by way of fitting them along with other 
facts into a larger scheme of explanation. In this respect, every 
human being, tutored or not, is no different from any trained ob-
server in our society.1 
 
For me, this realization initially presented itself concretely and specifi-
cally. When I was in seminary, I made the hike from one end of the 
campus to the other several times on any given day. Typically, biblical 
studies classes would let out at twenty past the hour, which meant that 
I would make my way across campus to the School of World Mission 
and Evangelism—from the “biblical” to the “anthropological” end—
often just in time before my next class began some ten minutes later. I 
have always thought it revealing that the disciplinary rift sometimes 
found between theological studies and anthropology on many a semi-
nary campus seemed to be so dramatized by the actual physical layout 
of my alma mater. 
More instructive, though perhaps less semiotic, was the resem-
blance in course content I frequently noticed at both ends of campus; 
a congruity which, ironically, often coincided with a disturbing lack of 
personal and relational affinity between the two departments. Much to 
my confusion, I would regularly walk out of an exegesis class, having 
                                               
1 Bruce J. Malina, “Reading Theory Perspective: Reading Luke–Acts,” in The 
Social World of Luke-Acts: Models for Interpretation, ed. Jerome H. Neyrey (Peabody, MA: 
Hendrickson, 1991), 3–23, 15. 
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just been privy to a penetrating—and not infrequently moving—dis-
course on the fundamental principles of biblical interpretation and 
their application, only to find essentially these very same principles—
albeit in social science dress—proffered in my next class by an anthro-
pology or missiology lecturer. Yet, despite this seeming conceptual 
similarity, there appeared to be no love lost between individuals occu-
pying chairs in each of these respective disciplines. Those involved 
seemed entirely unaware of their kinship to colleagues in other “com-
peting” departments. I lived with this tension for my first few years of 
formal theological training. It troubled me then and it troubles me still, 
due both to its cognitive incongruity and to the unnecessary dissension 
it produced on campus.2 
One day, toward the end of my seminary program, I stumbled 
upon a new spin on an old word that ultimately developed into a pro-
found heuristic template for me. A guest speaker, a distinguished bib-
lical scholar from another academic institution on the east coast, con-
ceded in her presentation that the task at hand in exegeting a biblical 
text was that of hermeneutics—an involvement in the art and process of 
interpretation. This, of course, was not a new idea for me; on the con-
trary, it was simply common seminary knowledge. The topic of biblical 
hermeneutics was part of standard seminary fare virtually anywhere 
one chose to study. Instead, it was what she went on to claim that 
forced me to sit up and take notice. As an underpinning of all of life’s 
activities, she said, from chatting with a neighbor to functioning on the 
local school board, from reading a newspaper to struggling for a pro-
motion, in all these situations we are constantly involved in the inevi-
table undertaking of encoding and decoding. We are meaning-givers 
and meaning-seekers in every one of our daily affairs and thus, she said, 
hermeneutics can never be for us some removed-from-reality pro-
                                               
2 Here I am reminded of the (possibly apocryphal) comment made by an emi-
nent lecturer of missiology at a large North American seminary lamenting that the 
only thing connecting their school of theology and their school of world missions 
was the plumbing. 
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cess—a hermetically sealed-off, cabbalistic enterprise exclusively re-
served for theologians reinforced by Greek and Hebrew scholars. The 
hermeneutic task—whether we realize it or not—embraces the very 
stuff of life itself. 
This provided me much fodder for thought that so many of my 
lecturers overlooked—the very element that caused me to hear re-
markably corresponding theories issue forth from members of two 
such sharply segregated parties! While one could find a lecturer from 
each of these disciplines championing principles of hermeneutics pe-
culiar to his or her individual field, each, in fact, often unwittingly suc-
ceeded in mirroring those self-same ideas also being brandished as 
unique by his or her rival across campus. Thus, the two groups ended 
up sounding curiously (and revealingly) alike—a fact which would have 
been most disconcerting for those involved. 
Consequently, hermeneutics came to occupy a special place in my 
thinking and since that time I have kept my eyes and ears open for its 
reappearance. My attentiveness was intended to test the hypothesis that 
a hermeneutically astute method aimed at probing biblical meaning ap-
plies to contexts wider than those normally supposed—it offers insight 
into the living of life itself. What follows will bear this out. 
Of course, many more insightful people than myself have also 
come to advocate similar versions of this tenet, such as Wilhelm 
Dilthey, Martin Heidegger, Paul Ricoeur, and Clifford Geertz, who 
have offered their own calls for a widening of the hermeneutical terrain. 
But I do not intend the thesis here to be a mere echoing of their ideas. 
For another thought has also puzzled me since my seminary days: Why 
is it that those who are cognizant of the conceptual bridge between 
hermeneutics in the social sciences and hermeneutics in biblical studies 
seem only to want to traverse the trestle in one direction? 
Note that it is not uncommon to come across studies in which 
social science constructs are applied to the biblical text as a means for 
gaining a deeper grasp of its import. I only need to mention Malina3 
                                               
3 Bruce J. Malina, “Why Interpret the Bible with the Social Sciences,” ABQ 2 
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or Jerome H. Neyrey,4 both members of “The Context Group,”5 in 
order give example. One of the fruits of their endeavors, The Social 
World of Luke-Acts: Models for Interpretation, is a fine contribution toward 
gaining insights from the social sciences to yield needed cultural cues 
for interpreting the biblical text. Or Kenneth Tollefson, the Christian 
anthropologist/missiologist at Seattle Pacific University, has examined 
the Old Testament book of Nehemiah more than once with a view 
toward providing guidelines for community organizers and cross-cul-
tural missionaries.6 Further examples are legion. 
But once again, notice the traffic heads in only one direction. One 
is obliged to ask: where are all the biblical scholars enlisted in the 
task—those reputed to have the most experience with hermeneutically 
astute methodologies designed to quarry meaning from the biblical 
text? Would not their expertise be put to good use if employed in the 
analysis of cultural scenes as their hermeneutical foci? Where are those 
of similar ilk willing to set their sights on present-day cultural phenom-
ena, savants sporting an array of finely-honed interpretive skills previ-
ously cultivated? Do these persons shy away from the task since culture 
as presently lived and experienced is so radically different from events 
encrypted in ancient codices? Is interpretation of written material a 
process so peculiar that it calls for an entirely different approach? By 
hearing from Dilthey, Heidegger, Ricoeur, and Geertz, I show this to 
be a false dichotomy. 
                                               
(1983): 119–33; Bruce J. Malina, Christian Origins and Cultural Anthropology: Practical 
Models for Biblical Interpretation (Atlanta: John Knox, 1986). 
4 Jerome H. Neyrey, ed., The Social World of Luke-Acts: Models for Interpretation 
(Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1991). 
5 According to Neyrey, in 1986 this group of scholars “formed a seminar to 
apply the social sciences for interpretation of biblical texts” (Social World, ix). 
6 Kenneth Tollefson, “Nehemiah, Model for Change Agents: A Social Science 
Approach to Scripture,” Christian Scholar’s Review 15 (1986): 107–24; Kenneth Tollefson, 
“The Nehemiah Model for Christian Missions,” Missiology 15 (1987): 31–55. In the sec-
ond installment of this series of articles I also will look at Nehemiah to illustrate a 
biblical hermeneutical method that is transferable to the discipline of anthropology. 
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In this first article, we will take a short look at the history and 
development of the notion of hermeneutics. By broadening the term’s 
utility, we will then be poised to analyze the interpretive process out-
side of biblical studies. Next, we will examine a representative example 
of this broadened interpretive process by looking at the social sci-
ences—namely, that represented by anthropologist James Spradley’s 
Development Research Sequence Method. 
In the second article (the one that follows the present one), I will 
more fully explore a fruitful methodology that was birthed from within 
biblical exegetical studies—Robert A. Traina’s methodology that he 
called “Methodical Bible Study.”7  Since this method is not widely 
known, I will offer there an illustration of Traina’s procedure as applied 
to the scriptures, so that the reader might be clear as to what it includes. 
Features of striking similarity will be apparent between these two ap-
proaches. 
Finally, in the third article of this series, given the paucity of cases 
in which the interpretation of a cultural scene borrows from biblical 
hermeneutical methodologies, I will employ Traina’s method to inter-
pret a specific cultural scene: small-scale peddling in West Java, Indo-
nesia. Even this modest, brief, and solitary example will show that in-
terpretive approaches in anthropology are impoverished if scholars 
continue to neglect their sister discipline, narrative biblical criticism. 
 
The Notion of Hermeneutics 
 
In discussing the origins of hermeneutics, Bernard Ramm makes the 
following observation: 
                                               
7 What Robert A. Traina called “Methodical Bible Study” is now known as 
“Inductive Bible Study.” I will also be drawing from notes gleaned from Traina’s 
class lectures during his tenure at Asbury Theological Seminary (1966–1988), from 
his book that first laid out his methodology (Robert A. Traina, Methodical Bible Study 
[Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2002]), as well as the book he coauthored with David R. 
Bauer toward the end of his life (Inductive Bible Study: A Comprehensive Guide to the Prac-
tice of Hermeneutics [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2014]). 
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Arbitrary interpretation may be a wrenching of the truth of the text 
or it may be the overapplication of a legitimate procedure (as in 
typological interpretation). The conscious setting up of rules is her-
meneutics (from the god Hermes, messenger of the gods, hence 
hermēneuein, to interpret; hermēneia, interpretation, commentary; and 
hē hermēneutikē technē, the skill or art of interpretation).8 
 
The term ἑρµηvεύω (hermēneuō) and its cognates, from which we derive 
an array of related English words, enjoy a lengthy history in classical 
and biblical Greek. In classical sources, they have three primary mean-
ings: (1) to speak or speak plainly, (2) to express or articulate, or (3) to 
translate.9 In the Septuagint (LXX), the terminology relates to transla-
tion (e.g., Gen 42:23; Esth 10:3; Ezra 4:7), although at times “describ-
ing” is also present (e.g., Job 42:18).10 In the New Testament over half 
of the 20 or so occurrences of this word group carry the idea of trans-
lation. In Luke 24:27, diermēneuō clearly involves exposition or interpre-
tation. The remaining seven occurrences are all connected to the inter-
pretation of tongues.11 Thus, with etymological inspiration from the 
Greek mythological messenger Hermes, the term hermeneutics and its 
cognates as found in these ancient documents denote translation or 
the conveyance of meaning from one realm to another with a view 
toward comprehension. 
Consequently, clustered around the term hermeneutics there 
arose a distinctive theological discipline concerned with the interpreta-
tion of sacred texts, primarily those of the biblical corpus.12 A corre-
sponding attempt was made to establish rules or principles which 
would prevent the process of interpretation from degenerating into a 
completely arbitrary discipline.13 As G. H. Schodde states, 
                                               
8 Bernard Ramm et al., Hermeneutics (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1987), 7. 
9 Anthony C. Thiselton, “Explain,” NIDNTT 1:573–84, 579–80. 
10 Thiselton, “Explain,” 580. 
11 Thiselton, “Explain,” 581–82. 
12 F. F. Bruce, “Hermeneutics,” NBD2, 476. 
13 Ramm et al., Hermeneutics, 7. Of course, Midrashic hermeneutics has been in 
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In nearly all cases, interpretation has in mind the thoughts of an-
other, and then, further, these thoughts expressed in another lan-
guage than that of the interpreter. In this sense it is used in Bib. 
research. A person has interpreted the thoughts of another when 
he has in mind a correct reproduction or photograph of the 
thought as it was conceived in the mind of the original writer or 
speaker. It is accordingly a purely reproductive process, involving 
no originality of thought on the part of the interpreter. If the latter 
adds anything of his own it is eisegesis [reading into the text] and 
not exegesis [culling from the text].14 
 
A Broadening of the Term’s Utility 
 
Many now realize that the focus of hermeneutics must be expanded. 
Rouse makes the point well: 
 
Many of the objects of interpretation in the human sciences are 
not themselves texts, of course. But actions, artifacts, social rela-
tions, and individual lives are analogues of texts in an important 
respect. The terms in which we understand them, as clear or con-
fused, significant or insignificant, are the same ones that guide our 
interpretation of texts. These various components of human life 
have a sense that can be expressed in words, even when not orig-
inally articulated this way. We interpret an action or artifact by 
saying what it means. This description proceeds with the same 
circular structure of presupposition and interpretation that char-
acterizes the reading of a text. We interpret actions by using 
words; we interpret texts by using words different from the origi-
                                               
existence since before the time of Christ. See Thiselton’s discussion of the Midrashic 
tradition and its bearing upon contemporary understanding of biblical hermeneutics 
in general (“Explain,” 580–81). 
14 G. H. Schodde, “Interpretation,” ISBE 3:1489–90. 
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nal ones. In either case, we understand them as already meaning-
ful, and we take that same meaning to be expressible in a form 
different from the original.15 
 
Thus, in response to statements like Schodde’s just above wherein the 
hermeneutical task is envisioned as simple one-to-one correspondence 
(often deemed a “mirroring” approach to interpretation), the last cou-
ple of centuries have witnessed a wholesale deepening and widening 
of what is thought to be involved in the process. 
The deepening has come about due to a realization of the naïveté of 
postulating interpretation as a mere detached “reproductive process.” 
It is now realized that, in the enterprise of hermeneutics, the undertak-
ing is far more than a mere indifferent clarification of the technical 
difficulties and challenges found in texts (often the German term 
Erklären is employed here—descriptive, technical explanation). In-
stead, the exegete must attempt to grasp the import of the communi-
cation event at its deepest levels (Verstehen—discerning comprehend-
ing or understanding).16 Hence, Thiselton maintains: 
 
[I]f the interpreter is to understand a text adequately and correctly, 
due account must be taken of his own subjectivity. His own pre-
suppositions, cultural orientation, and psychological capacities 
will shape his understanding of the text. Some of these presuppo-
sitions may act as a barrier to understanding; yet it is more im-
portant to note that they also serve as an indispensable point of 
contact with the subject-matter of the text, at least at the com-
mencement of the ongoing process of understanding.17 
 
                                               
15 Joseph Rouse, Knowledge and Power (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1987), 44. 
16 Ramm et al., Hermeneutics, 7, 134. 
17 Thiselton, “Explain,” 583. 
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The one sitting before the text—the interpreter—is no mere spec-
tator; she or he undeniably figures in the equation. Remaining oblivi-
ous to this fact will not only distort the interpretive process but, as 
alluded to above, it will also deprive the exegete of a crucial realization 
that can prove quite helpful in the hermeneutical process: the aware-
ness of “historicality.”18 Both the text and the interpreter are historical 
entities, each possessing a unique context. Hence, a meeting of these 
two entities can serve to engender a whole range of new insights. This-
elton argues, “the horizons of the interpreter and the horizons of the 
text must be brought into a relationship of active engagement and di-
alogue, until the two sets of judgments, or of question and answers, 
become eventually fused into one.”19 This view relates to an entangle-
ment that philosophers deem “the hermeneutical circle.” Its influence 
can be felt not only in biblical studies, but indeed it colors the entire 
quest for human understanding. We will examine its impact in more 
detail below. 
The widening of the discipline of hermeneutics involves its purview 
being broadened beyond the confines of theological studies. Hence, 
the present-day science of hermeneutics now designates “the interpre-
tation of or the search for meaning in texts, in human existence, in 
society, and so on.”20 This came about primarily by way of the realiza-
tion that any cultural event or artifact seems virtually to cry out for 
interpretation. Homo sapiens is a meaning-giving creature attempting to 
make sense of life. Tellingly, the sociological phenomenon of commu-
nal meaninglessness has been labelled by Émile Durkheim, anomie (i.e., 
                                               
18 Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Wolfhart Pannenberg are 
mainly responsible for developing the concept of “historicality” or historical relativ-
ity. Cf. Thiselton, “Explain,” 583; Anthony C. Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics: 
The Theory and Practice of Transforming Biblical Reading (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1992). 
19 “Explain,” 583. This is reminiscent of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s “fusion of 
horizons” (Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 2nd 
ed. [New York: Continuum, 1998]; Georgia Warnke, Gadamer: Hermeneutics, Tradition 
and Reason [Oxford: Polity, 1987]). 
20 Charlotte Seymour-Smith, Macmillan Dictionary of Anthropology (London: Mac-
millan, 1986), 136. 
Construing Culture as Composition—Part 1 | 17 
the lack or present irrelevance of a publicly accepted, socially-function-
ing set of interpretive principles).21 
The collective endowment of cultural elements with public mean-
ing is most generally a tacit process. This is due to its functioning by 
means of a socially agreed-upon constellation of implied standards and 
statutes, what sociologists and anthropologists call Weltanschauung (i.e., 
world view). However, whenever a crossing of world view channels 
between two or more social actors or groups of social actors arises, 
communicative dissonance occurs, whether it is due to temporal dis-
tance (generational variance), geographical distance (locality variance), 
philosophical distance (ideological variance), or any other potential dis-
tance. And if an increasing amount of dissonance is apparent, a person 
will become acutely aware of the interpretive process (i.e., the demand 
for and the process of interpretation will become exceedingly manifest 
as a conscious one). To philosophers and social scientists alike, this 
fact serves only to underscore the ubiquitous, hermeneutically-steeped 
enterprise latent in everyday affairs. For the average person, society is 
ultimately a text in need of exegesis. 
Historically, the philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey was one of the first 
to call attention to this fact: 
 
[He] argued that many nontextual features of human life, such as 
actions, tools, social roles, and individual lives, can and should be 
taken as meaningful in the same way as texts are…. Dilthey 
thought that only by taking meaning seriously could we have any 
                                               
21 Peter Berger, The Sacred Canopy (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967). Lesslie 
Newbigin links the diminution of biblical hermeneutics and the resulting appearance 
of anomie in the Christian community: “[In the biblical vision,] if there is no point 
in the story as a whole, there is no point in my own action. If the story is meaningless, 
any action of mine is meaningless. The loss of a vision for the future necessarily 
produces that typical phenomenon of our society which the sociologists call anomie, 
a state in which publicly accepted norms and values have disappeared” (The Gospel in 
a Pluralist Society [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989], 91). 
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hope of understanding human beings and the social milieu in 
which they—we—live.22 
 
Embracing this line of thinking, philosophers such as Martin 
Heidegger, Jürgen Habermas, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Paul Ricoeur, and 
others have pushed the point even further.23 Developing the science of 
hermeneutics into an all-encompassing philosophical system, these 
thinkers have sought to gild the very act of living with the paradigm’s 
impressive analytical power. Thus, they have ardently opposed the 
 
traditional accounts of hermeneutics as the epistemology of a par-
ticular region of knowledge (the Geisteswissenschaften) [which] dis-
tinguish[es] sharply between the artificial language of the natural 
sciences and the ordinary language of human interaction…. [In-
stead, the broader form of hermeneutics] collapses both of these 
distinctions by insisting that everyday knowledge and scientific 
knowledge are not different in kind.24 
 
This is a step that even Dilthey, a product of his age, was not yet pre-
pared to take. For, while it is true that Dilthey was a pioneer in opposing 
an empiricist model of knowledge for what we today would term the 
social sciences, he still “conceded the adequacy of empiricist accounts 
                                               
22 Rouse, Knowledge and Power, 42. Cf. Bruce, “Hermeneutics.” 
23 Martin Heidegger Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Rob-
inson (New York: Harper, 1962); cf. Stanley Rosen, “Squaring the Hermeneutical 
Circle,” Review of Metaphysics 44 (1991): 707–28; Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Hu-
man Interests (Boston: Beacon, 1968); Gadamer, Truth and Method, “The Model of the 
Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text,” in Interpretive Social Science: A Reader, 
ed. P. Rabinow and W. Sullivan (Berkeley: University of California Press), 73–102; 
Thiselton, New Horizons; and David J. Bosch, Transforming Mission: Paradigm Shifts in 
Theology of Mission (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1991), 350–51. 
24 Rouse, Knowledge and Power, 51. Robert N. Bellah et al. make a similar appeal 
for a dissolving of the division between the humanities and the social sciences (Habits 
of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life [New York: Harper & Row, 
1985], 297–307). 
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of the physical and biological sciences but [simply] insisted that extend-
ing empiricism to account for the scholarly investigation of human life 
and culture was illegitimate.”25 With this step taken by Dilthey’s suc-
cessors, however, all of life has become subject to interpretation. Like 
breathing, they say, humans need to exegete to maintain life. 
 
The Hermeneutical Circle 
 
Picking up on Dilthey’s analogy of life as a text to be explained, philos-
opher Paul Ricoeur has framed the interpretive process as a three-phase 
hermeneutical dialectic in which human inquiry moves (1) from under-
standing as a guess about the whole (2) to explanation as a moment of 
testing and structuring one’s guesses and (3) back to understanding as 
comprehension.26 Something like this three-fold mechanism has histor-
ically been labelled “the hermeneutical circle.” Rosen describes it well: 
“The traditional version of the hermeneutical circle goes something like 
this: whereas the parts must be understood in terms of the whole, the 
whole can be understood only by way of the parts.”27 
With such a circuitous movement appears two terms briefly men-
tioned earlier: Erklären (to explain or interpret) and Verstehen (to un-
derstand), labels corresponding to Ricoeur’s second and third move-
ments above. In Ricoeur’s thought, these two components which con-
stitute the interpretive enterprise—explanation and comprehension—
do not stand in opposition to each other since they serve together to 
dialectically illuminate and provoke the interpretive process. Here is 
how he lays out the process. 
The initial phase, “naïve grasping,” involves a revelatory moment 
in which insight dawns upon the interpreter at the commencement of 
                                               
25 Rouse, Knowledge and Power, 42. 
26 Mark Kline Taylor, “Symbolic Dimensions in Cultural Anthropology,” Cur-
rent Anthropology 26 (1985): 167–85, 168. 
27 Rosen, “Squaring the Hermeneutical Circle,” 707. 
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the attempt to interpret.28 As we will see below, it is the legitimacy of 
this very point that provides a base to spur the process on, thereby 
keeping interpretation from degenerating into thorough-going relativ-
ism. Thus, Rosen can say: 
 
What has been traditionally called the hermeneutical circle is not 
circular. We do indeed understand the parts in terms of the whole, 
and the whole in terms of the parts. In each case, namely, with 
respect to the whole as well as to its parts, what initiates interpretation 
is understanding, which I am willing to call insight or even intuition, to say 
nothing of the many other names that this everywhere accessible but impossible 
to analyze phenomenon has been assigned. Understanding becomes ei-
ther circular or regressive when we attempt to explain it on the 
basis of a conceptual analysis of pre-understanding. But pre-un-
derstanding, after all is said and done, is just understanding.29 
 
And this is just what Ricoeur calls it: “understanding as a guess about 
the whole.” Ricoeur’s “naïve grasping” constitutes a veritable “first 
principle” out of which everything else springs.30 This points to the 
fundamental faith commitment which he believes is inherent in the 
entire process of living; faith being the crucial (and unavoidable) ele-
ment.31 Newbigin echoes this same idea, “[C]ircularity is … the mark 
                                               
28 Taylor, “Symbolic Dimensions,” 168. 
29 Rosen, “Squaring the Hermeneutical Circle,” 727, emphasis added. 
30 Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt, and Margaret Jacob, Telling the Truth About His-
tory (New York: W. W. Norton, 1994), 286. 
31 Cf. the underscoring of this principle by Thomas Kuhn as it relates to the 
physical sciences: “The man who embraces a new paradigm at an early stage must 
often do so in defiance of the evidence provided by problem-solving. He must, that is, 
have faith that the new paradigm will succeed with the many large problems that confront 
it, knowing only that the older paradigm has failed with a few. A decision of that kind 
can only be made on faith” (The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd. ed. [Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1970], 158, emphasis added). Kuhn’s work, of course, 
has been of primary importance in the recent widespread repudiation of the fissure 
purportedly separating Geisteswissenschaften (humanities) from Naturwissenschaften (nat-
ural sciences). 
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of all fundamental thinking. One can stand outside the circle, declining 
to accept the starting point. But then, if one is to make any sense of 
things at all, one has to work in another circle.”32 Thus, a satisfactory 
hermeneutical approach will be forced to “recognize belief as the source 
of all knowledge and consciously embrace a ‘fiduciary framework.’”33 
Or, in time-honored Augustinian terms, “unless one believes, one shall 
not understand.”34 
This is not the end of the issue. We will return to the hermeneutical 
circle momentarily. But following on with Ricoeur’s logic we see that the 
second movement involves an attempt to arrange, organize, and validate 
based upon the aforementioned initial intuition. “It orders the whole 
and fills it out, identifying and relating its parts in ‘systems’ or ‘struc-
tures,’ in an effort to ‘verify’ or ‘validate’ the guess.”35 Hence, Erklä-
ren—the term that points to descriptive, structured, and analytical expla-
nation—follows on from the intuitive hunch as a means of appraising 
its veracity in a tactile world. And in the third phase of this construct,  
 
[E]xplanation has led to comprehensive “understanding” of a 
possible whole world and a preferred “mode of being-in-the-
world.” … Departing from a naive guess, explanation makes it 
possible for interpreters to “comprehend” [Verstehen] the funda-
mental “boundary situations” and “existential conflicts” of human 
being-in-the-world. Explanation is, therefore, a mediation be-
tween the two stages of understanding [i.e., between intuition and 
comprehension].36 
                                               
32 Newbigin, Gospel in a Pluralist Society, 94. 
33 Michael Polanyi as cited in Bosch, Transforming Mission, 359, emphasis original. 
34 Bosch, Transforming Mission, 359. The Latin phrase is nisi credideritis, non intelligitis. 
35 Taylor, “Symbolic Dimensions,” 168. 
36 Taylor, “Symbolic Dimensions,” 169. 
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As Ricoeur himself puts it, “understanding precedes, accompanies, 
closes and thus envelops explanation. In return, explanation develops un-
derstanding analytically.”37 Within Ricoeur’s framework, then, the her-
meneutical circle is an ever-expanding spiral leading on to greater clar-
ity in the evolving process of comprehending. This is very similar to 
the type of progressive dialectic movement found in Martin 
Heidegger’s hermeneutical philosophy: 
 
Not to be confused with the kind of circular reasoning that con-
sists in begging the question, [Heidegger’s] hermeneutical circular 
[sic] way of thinking involves a continual interpretation and rein-
terpretation in which understanding of Being that is already given 
with human existence itself is rounded out and corrected while, 
correspondingly, human existence becomes progressively under-
stood in the light of Being.38 
 
However, remembering I promised to return to the earlier discus-
sion concerning the more circular form of the hermeneutical circle, 
there does remain a problem. Whether we call upon Ricoeur’s “naïve 
                                               
37 Cited in Taylor, “Symbolic Dimensions,” 168. 
38 John Macquarrie, as cited in Frank N. Magill, ed., Masterpieces of World Philos-
ophy (New York: HarperCollins, 1990). Cf. John Macquarrie, Martin Heidegger (Rich-
mond: John Knox, 1968). Although in this series of articles I will exploit this three-
fold dialectical pattern by using slightly different nomenclature, it must be realized 
that verstehen (to understand) is not actually so much a step in the process itself as it 
is an evolving disclosure brought on by the first two phases. It parallels what Traina, 
whose hermeneutical method we will take up in the next article in this series, desig-
nates “application”: “Theoretically, the application of a passage represents the sum 
total of [its] preceding two steps [observation and interpretation]. For once one has 
discovered the universal truth of a passage as well as the contemporary situation 
which falls within its province, then one may bring the passage to bear on the situa-
tion, and the result is application” (Methodical Bible Study, 215; Bauer and Traina later 
shift the terminology to “appropriation”; cf. Inductive Bible Study, 319–35). Thus, the 
verb verstehen can (and probably always should) shift from emphasizing the process 
of understanding as comprehension (the third moment) back to understanding as a 
guess about the whole (the first moment), only to begin the interpretive process all 
over again. This is what is meant by continual interpretation and reinterpretation 
which rounds out and corrects. 
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grasp” or upon Heidegger’s “pre-understanding,” we are still operating 
at an a priori, individualized, parochial level, reminiscent of Wittgen-
stein’s language games. The problem is that this hooks all understand-
ing (including any endowment of interpretive insight) into a privatized, 
self-fabricated process. Consequently, reality can easily degenerate into 
a mere by-product of a self-indulgent, cloistered mental process with 
all universal meaning finally left up for grabs. Where, then, is the arbiter 
in this quest for understanding? Are all attempts to interpret equally 
valid? Are all “naïve graspings” equally satisfactory? What about the 
world we experience every day? What prevents us from mistakenly re-
ifying our idiosyncratic cognitive models and treating them as if they 
were reality? 
Rosen suggests,  
 
If the process is entirely constructive, if in other words the sense 
of the perceived entity is entirely produced by the act of percep-
tion, then cognition is not world-construction (which requires sub-
ordination of cognition to general laws that cannot themselves be 
the products of a given and contingent world-horizon); it is an act 
of radical arbitrariness, and therefore it is not at all the production 
of senses but senseless or chaotic flux. 
Since we cannot evade this lapse into chaos by the construction 
of transcendental structures of spontaneity, there remains only one 
method for assessing and regulating the insights of the living intel-
ligence, and this, not surprisingly, is by checking them against our 
experience, both discursive and silent. The traditional method for 
determining whether one has understood a … text is two fold: 
first, we attempt to explain all parts of the text as integral to a 
whole; second, we discuss our interpretations with other persons, 
whose competency we determine, not by rules and conformity to 
models, but on the basis of the understanding their words exhibit.39 
                                               
39 “Squaring the Hermeneutical Circle,” 725. 
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Thus, the key to disarming a “vicious” (read: circular) form of the her-
meneutical circle is by means of (1) an appeal to everyday life which is 
(2) lived out collectively amid others. 
First, we will consider the “everydayness” of this proposal. As an-
thropologist Clifford Geertz attests, “common sense, or some kindred 
conception, has become a central category, almost the central category, 
in a wide range of modern philosophical systems.”40 One need not 
search far for validation of Geertz’s statement. The view is so widely 
embraced that authorities in an array of disciplines echo this similar 
conviction.41 
Geertz himself, in a chapter entitled Common Sense as a Cultural Sys-
tem, offers five seemingly universal “quasi-qualities” of common sense 
“as an everywhere-found cultural form”:42 
 
1. Naturalness  An air of “of-courseness,” a sense of “it figures” 
being cast over all things; 
2. Practicalness  The quality of being able to know what’s what; 
3. Thinness  The belief that the world is what the wide-
awake, uncomplicated person takes it to be; 
4. Immethodicalness A shameless and unapologetical “ad hoc-
ness”; 
5. Accessibleness  The belief that any person with faculties reason-
ably intact can grasp the conclusions reached. 
 
                                               
40 Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology (New 
York: Basic Books, 1983), 76. 
41 As representative here, see Robert N. Bellah, “Social Science as Practical 
Reason,” in Ethics, the Social Sciences, and Policy Analysis, ed. Daniel Callahan and Bruce 
Jennings (New York: Plenum, 1983), 37–64; Appleby, Hunt, and Jacob, Telling the 
Truth About History. Especially note Appleby and associates’ focus on “practical rea-
son” and “pragmatism” and the role each has in the hermeneutical enterprise (247–
53; 283–91). In fact, directly related to its rightful position in the interpretive task, 
Rouse contends that “the various versions of pragmatism that have emerged as re-
sponses to the collapse of empiricism can usefully be regarded as an attempt to uni-
versalize hermeneutics” (Knowledge and Power, 41). 
42 Geertz, Local Knowledge, 85; these are discussed in 85–91. 
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While the entirety of Geertz’s article is an attempt to illustrate the pa-
rochial nature of common sense as a cultural artifact (hence, his title: 
Common Sense as a Cultural System), the concept as discussed in the article 
itself is freighted with an overwhelming “pan-cultural” quality. Even 
speaking of common sense as a “system” and ascribing it five generally 
universal “quasi-qualities” implies something all-encompassing. Thus, 
Geertz claims for this phenomenon (or more correctly, “suggests”) “an 
ingenerate order … capable of being empirically uncovered and con-
ceptually formulated.”43 
For my purposes, the most striking feature of this sort of 
knowledge is not simply its affinity to Ricoeur’s concept of insight em-
phasized above but also the fact that we are here speaking of a brand 
of knowledge accessible to all persons everywhere. This is no esoteric 
knowledge hidden away—scientific mantras stowed in private infor-
mation caches to be scrutinized by an élite, privileged few. Instead, this 
is the sort of wisdom accessed by average communities of ordinary 
folk found everywhere (thus, common sense). 
This appeal to proximal, everyday life corresponds nicely with Al-
fred North Whitehead’s corrective for what he calls “the fallacy of mis-
placed concreteness” (i.e., the elevating of the ancillary to the pri-
mary).44 The answer to this “very subtle fallacy—more a general limi-
tation of conceptual thought than an error in logic”45—is a “recurrence 
                                               
43 Geertz, Local Knowledge, 92. 
44 Per Whitehead, this fallacy involves “neglecting the degree of abstraction 
involved in thought when an actual entity is considered merely so far as it exemplifies 
certain categories of thought” (Whitehead as cited in Herman E. Daly and John B. 
Cobb, Jr., For the Common Good: Redirecting the Economy toward Community, the Environ-
ment, and a Sustainable Future, 2nd. ed. [Boston: Beacon, 1994], 36). Daly and Cobb 
summarize it this way: “it is the fallacy involved whenever thinkers forget the degree 
of abstraction involved in thought and draw unwarranted conclusions about concrete 
actuality. [In other words,] … neglecting the extent to which our concepts are ab-
stract, and therefore also neglecting the rest of the reality from which they have been 
abstracted” (For the Common Good, 36). Ultimately, this is simply another way of re-
christening the vicious form of the hermeneutical circle. 
45 Daly and Cobb, For the Common Good, 41. 
26  | The Journal of Inductive Biblical Studies 6/1:7-54 (Winter 2019) 
to the concrete in search of inspiration.”46 It is instructive that what 
Ricoeur presented above as the initiating element in the interpretive 
process (i.e., insight) corresponds quite nicely with that which, being 
found concretely tucked away in the hard-tack vicissitudes of everyday 
life, seems to function as our surest safeguard against excessive inter-
pretive abstraction (i.e., inspiration). Hence, this same insight qua inspi-
ration which initially serves to kick-start the interpretive process on its 
way also essays to anchor major concerns as major. 
Consequently, if we combine this with Ricoeur’s “naïve grasp,” it 
now seems conceivable that there is a basic “common sense” corre-
spondence between what we see and what actually exists and that it is 
this correlation which is the basis for our initial insight.47 As Hiebert 
has said, “we see through a glass darkly, but we do see. We are not 
totally blind.”48 This being the case, it is now clear that alert participa-
tion in everyday life is what serves to set us on the path destined for 
comprehension. 49  Emulating Ricoeur, the process begins with in-
sight—or, if you will, a naïve grasp—and continues through analysis 
and description (Erklären) to an ever-unfolding state of comprehension 
(Verstehen). 
                                               
46 Whitehead, as cited in Daly and Cobb, For the Common Good, 36, cf. 41–43. 
47 Of course, a Christian understanding assumes this point from the start. First, 
the Incarnation signifies a primary correspondence between the uniquely transitory 
and the supremely universal and it blesses, sanctifies and employs this very corre-
spondence. Second, a primary source (per Barth, seemingly the solitary source!) of 
biblical knowledge is imparted by means of oracle or prophecy; namely, via revela-
tion—what could just as easily be labelled insight. For the Christian, the existence of 
the Scriptures in their entirety testifies to this fact. 
48 “Beyond Anti-Colonialism to Globalism,” Missiology 20 (1991): 263–81, 274. 
49 This call for “alert participation” bears a striking resemblance to what in 
anthropology—especially since Bronislaw Malinowski and Margaret Mead—has 
come to be called “participant observation.” Cf. Julia G. Crane and Michael V. An-
grosino, Field Projects in Anthropology: A Student Handbook, 2nd. ed. (Prospect Heights, 
IL: Waveland, 1984), 64–75; James P. Spradley, Participant Observation (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1980); and Seymour-Smith, Macmillan Dictionary of An-
thropology, 215–16. 
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Yet, of course, we cannot travel this path alone. It must be admit-
ted that the interpretive task is (or at least should be) a decidedly com-
munal undertaking. In fact, the consensus is that any sort of ethically-
oriented legitimate interpretation is literally impossible outside of a 
community structure. As Bruce C. Birch and Larry L. Rasmussen as-
sert, “homo ethicus is homo socius.”50 And of course, this applies regardless 
of whether the interpretive significance rendered flows normatively 
(i.e., ethically) or descriptively. For, as development studies ethicist 
Muhammad Anisur Rahman reminds us, even “the scientific character 
of objectivity of knowledge rests on its social verifiability.”51 And, as 
if to reinforce Rahman’s claim, Thomas Kuhn maintains that “a [sci-
entific] paradigm governs, in the first instance, not a subject matter but 
rather a group of practitioners. Any study of paradigm-directed or of 
paradigm-shattering research must begin by locating the responsible 
group or groups.”52 Of course, while reinforcing my focus on com-
munities of interpretation, this statement like those of Geertz’s above 
could still simply shift us from an individual to a communal solipsism, 
with thorough-going relativism following quickly on its heels (a sort of 
communal or cultural relativism). Once again, we must ask ourselves, 
what forestalls this (now collective) tumble into ultimate uncertainty? 
What keeps our interpretation from becoming a thoroughly relativized 
undertaking? Besides our (now communal) common sense safeguard, 
there is yet one additional factor capable of coming into play. 
This factor is intra- as well as inter-community dialogue, which 
together help to give rise to emerging, transcendent, cross-cultural in-
terpretation. This is analogous to Paul Hiebert’s call for the evolution 
                                               
50 Bruce C. Birch and Larry L. Rasmussen, Bible and Ethics in the Christian Life 
(Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1976), 125. 
51 Muhammad Anisur Rahman, “The Theoretical Standpoint of PAR,” in Action 
and Knowledge: Breaking the Monopoly with Participatory Action-Research, ed. Orlando Fals-
Borda and Muhammad Anisur Rahman (New York: The Apex Press), 13–23, 15. 
52 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 180. The entirety of this 
book by Kuhn is focused upon the presence of scientific paradigms as hermeneutical 
devices and the historical role these have played in the natural sciences. 
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of a transcultural theology (issued with the world-wide Christian com-
munity in mind).53 
 
The critical hermeneutics that involve a dialogue between … dif-
ferent cultures can help us all to develop a more culture-free un-
derstanding…. On the one hand, it keeps us from the legalism of 
imposing foreign norms upon a society without taking into ac-
count its specific situations. On the other, it keeps us from a situ-
ational ethics that is purely relativistic in nature.54 
 
Of course, the cultural gaps spanned here need to be of a wide variety, 
including those dividing peoples synchronically as well as diachroni-
cally. Speaking of exegesis as it applies to the biblical text, Ramm clar-
ifies the point well:  
 
In that the interpreter is separated from his materials in time there 
is a historical gap; in that his culture is different from that of his 
text there is a cultural gap; in that the text is usually in a different 
language there is the linguistic gap; in that the document originates 
in another country there is the geological gap and the biological 
gap (the flora and fauna). In that usually a totally different attitude 
towards life and the universe exists in the text it can be said that 
there is a philosophical gap (German: Weltanschauung, the meta-
physical manner in which the universe is put together; Weltbild, the 
                                               
53 Hiebert uses the word “metatheology” for what I am here calling “transcul-
tural theology.” 
54 Paul G. Hiebert, Anthropological Insights for Missionaries (Grand Rapids: Baker, 
1985), 103, cf. 216–17. The only amendment needed to Hiebert’s claim relates to his 
assertion that out of such a process will emerge a transcultural understanding “that 
transcends cultural differences” (Hiebert, Anthropological Insights, 217). It is perhaps 
more accurate to state that transcultural comprehension of any given topic will not 
simply emerge definitively but will always be in the process of emerging in an exponentially 
evolving epiphany. This is the dialectic I examined above, the one I am now saying 
is at work in community. Hermeneutics is, by definition, a dynamic, never-ending, 
on-going process. 
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physical manner [scientific or pseudo-scientific] [sic] in which the 
universe is put together).55 
 
In other words, what has been sensed, interpreted, and comprehended 
by others in the annals of history must also have considerable bearing 
upon our present-day hermeneutical endeavors. Not only those be-
yond oceans and over mountains removed geographically, not simply 
communities possessing linguistic styles quite different from our own, 
but also persons from bygone eras—individuals found on the other 
side of the historical gap—these, too, must continue to be given voice 
in the hermeneutical community.56 
A transcultural hermeneutical community intently concerned with 
meaning quarried from the detritus of everyday life will serve to safe-
guard interpretation in the face of parochialism and narrow-minded-
ness. Ricoeur’s insight-initiated dialectic will then begin to take on a 
more universal quality due, in part, to the wide variety of individuals, 
communities, and perspectives involved in the process. 
In what follows, I will attempt to dive into this ever-unfolding 
hermeneutical circle, assuming the above dialectic to be operative as I 
go. This is the very reason I have given space to the above discussion. 
For, without a clear understanding of Ricoeur’s dialectic view of the 
interpretive process—and the critical role he gives to insight within it—
the thesis of this essay will surely be rendered dubious at best.57 
 
                                               
55 Ramm, Hermeneutics, 7–8. 
56 Historically removed persons (and communities) may also have lived out 
their days in places yet geographically divorced as well as linguistically separated from 
us. As Ramm implies above, the overarching element here is the distinctly different 
Weltanschauung brought about by a differing community. Note this from Birch and 
Rasmussen: “The ‘seeing’ so critical to the moral life is not something we can provide 
for ourselves by ourselves. It is almost wholly dependent upon relationships with 
‘significant others,’ whether friend or foe, persons near or far, even real or imaginary. 
‘Seeing’ is, in the end, a community achievement and gift, whatever the indispensable 
role of the ‘I’ in attaining sight” (Bible and Ethics, 102, emphasis original). 
57 The communal safeguard highlighted above, of course, is underscored and 
acknowledged by the public accessibility of my analysis as presented here. 
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The Narrative Nature of Truth 
 
If, as has been claimed above, “society is ultimately a text in need of 
exegesis” and, therefore, “humans . . . need to exegete to maintain life,” 
then what we are principally dealing with here is a view of society (and 
the history of that society) which is analogous to narrative. Of course, 
this assertion has already been hinted at above. 
In this series of articles, I will look at the application of this prin-
ciple in relation to what are typically taken to be two distinct disci-
plines—the theological and the anthropological. Accordingly, it would 
amount to the better part of wisdom for us to first test the heuristic 
value of the concept of narrative as a hermeneutical vehicle in each of 
these fields. Clearly scholars like Appleby et al. take story as the very 
building blocks of human comprehension and understanding when 
they assert that “rejecting all meta-narratives cannot make sense, be-
cause narratives and meta-narratives are the kinds of stories that make 
action in the world possible. They make action possible because they 
make it meaningful.”58 Nevertheless, if neither biblical nor cultural 
materials are ultimately found to be compatible with a narrative under-
standing of truth, then my present effort to apply this premise as a 
principle will certainly yield for us obscurity as opposed to clarity. 
 
The Narrative Nature of Biblical Truth 
 
Since the Christian Scripture is made up of a vast collection of stories 
incorporating one grand, over-arching drama, or Heilsgeschichte (salva-
tion history) as Cullmann classified it, it might at first seem unnecessary 
to call for an adoption of the concept of narrative as the basis for a 
Christian understanding of truth. This is even more clearly the case 
when we consider how the discipline of hermeneutics originally de-
rived from an on-going communal encounter with the biblical text, an 
                                               
58 Appleby, Hunt, and Jacob, Telling the Truth About History, 236. 
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encounter with a story that stretches across the pages of the biblical 
text. As Stanley Hauerwas affirms, “Christian convictions constitute a 
narrative, a language, that requires a transformation of the self if we 
are to see, as well as be, truthful…. To be Christian is not to obey 
certain commandments or rules, but to learn to grow into the story of 
Jesus as the form of God’s kingdom.”59 
Yet, since the Enlightenment, scholars have not considered a nar-
rative approach to Scripture as a legitimate focus for the discipline of 
hermeneutics until relatively recently. Instead, Robert Alter argues,  
 
[V]irtually all [hermeneutical] activity has been what we might call 
“excavative”—either literally, with the archeologist’s spade and 
reference to its findings or with a variety of analytic tools intended 
to uncover the original meanings of biblical words, the life situa-
tions in which specific texts were used, the sundry sources from 
which longer texts were assembled.60 
 
Perhaps this offers yet one more answer to my question posed above 
concerning the whereabouts of experienced biblical scholars who (it 
was hoped) could be enlisted in the task of analyzing cultural scenes as 
their hermeneutical foci. For if all cultural scenes in need of analysis 
are analogous to narrative and yet biblical interpreters have not histor-
ically approached the text as narrative, it naturally follows that these 
persons will not be as well-equipped as was perhaps previously as-
sumed. But we might ask ourselves: How could this be? How could 
                                               
59 Stanley Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), 30. 
60 Robert Alter, The Art of Biblical Narrative (New York: Basic Books, 1981), 13. 
This is, however, changing. As biblical scholar David Gooding admits, “forty years 
ago study of the literary structure of biblical books (or rhetorical criticism as it is 
called in some circles) was but a trickle; in the last decade or so it has become a flood” 
(According to Luke: A New Exposition of the Third Gospel [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1987], 7). For a probe into this type of biblical hermeneutical methodology under a 
different heading, see Mark Allan Powell’s thoughts as found in the series, Guides to 
Biblical Scholarship (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990) and What is Narrative Criticism? A New 
Approach to the Bible (London: SPCK, 1993).  
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biblical scholars miss all the rich narrative material so conspicuously 
arrayed in the Bible? How could the Scriptures’ very substance not be 
manifest beyond doubt to them? 
The answer seems to be that, ever since the Enlightenment, bibli-
cal exegetes (along with their secular counterparts) have tended to rel-
egate to cellars of triviality the concept of “story” in most of their in-
tellectual pursuits (with the rest of us generally following their lead). 
This seems due to the fact, with the dawn of the Enlightenment, “a 
different mode of rationality began to predominate. Reason supplanted 
faith as point of departure. Theology now differed from other aca-
demic disciplines only in its “object,” not in its method or point of 
departure. It was basically comparable with other disciplines.”61 
Hence, in order to maintain respectability in this age of reason, 
theology—and as a result biblical studies—was forced to yield to the 
newly reigning paradigm.62 Science, as the logic went, was certainly not 
based upon anything as arbitrary and fictive as story; all thinking per-
sons should concede that insight worth having must be based upon 
“objective,” cold, hard facts. Thus, most exegetes felt that  
 
they could no longer, as their predecessors were prone to do, ig-
nore the [span of centuries between biblical times and the present] 
and [thus] enjoy direct access to the biblical story. They believed, 
rather, that their task was to re-create, as far as possible, the orig-
inal story and glean a message from it for today’s church.63 
 
And of course, this resulted in the “excavation” activities that Alter 
spoke of above. What the biblical scholars were mining for, both in 
the soil and in the text, were facts—which all knew to be at loggerheads 
with story since in the reigning paradigm story is arbitrary and fictive. 
Persons such as Tillich, Bultmann, Jeremias and others attempted to 
                                               
61 Bosch, Transforming Mission, 275. 
62 Cf. Bosch, Transforming Mission, 277–78. 
63 Bosch, Transforming Mission, 277. 
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distil from the narrative materials that truth which most pertinently 
spoke to the modern woman or man. 
One of the problems with this approach, however, is that it simply 
does not do justice to the nature of the biblical text itself. As Hauerwas 
says, “[I]t is crucial for us … to see that [biblical truth] is not acci-
dentally narrative.64 
 
Narrative is not secondary for our knowledge of God; there is no 
“point” that can be separated from the story. The narratives 
through which we learn of God are the point. Stories are not sub-
stitute explanations we can someday hope to supplant with more 
straightforward accounts. Precisely to the contrary, narratives are 
necessary to our understanding of those aspects which admit of 
no further explanation, i.e., God, the world, and the self.65 
 
Old Testament scholar Walter Brueggemann seems to agree: 
 
The rhetoric of the [biblical] narrative invites the listener out be-
yond the world of predictability into another world of thought 
and risk and gift, a world in which the unexpected happens, in 
which connections surprise us, and in which new life is miracu-
lously given. The purpose and intent of these narratives is to break 
life open beyond our prosaic reductions, to subvert our domesti-
cated expectations, and to evoke fresh dimensions of identity and 
faith.66 
 
The primary reason for this breaking free into “another world of 
thought and risk and gift” is due to the heart of the hermeneutical quest 
itself: what we wish for in the process is an encounter with the very 
person of God himself. And as Donald Bloesch reminds us, 
                                               
64 Hauerwas, Peaceable Kingdom, 25. 
65 Hauerwas, Peaceable Kingdom, 26. 
66 Walter Brueggemann, Finally Comes the Poet: Daring Speech for Proclamation 
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989), 114–15. 
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our language about God can be at the most analogical, not univo-
cal, for there can be no direct or exact correspondence between 
human ideas and the veritable Word of God. It is also imperative 
for us to reaffirm the mystery of the accommodation of the Holy 
Spirit to the deficiencies and limitations of human language.67 
 
Or, as Hauerwas says, “‘God,’ we must remember, is a common name, 
to which we can ascribe attributions only as we learn of God through 
history.”68 
 
“[D]octrines” are themselves a story, or perhaps better, the outline 
of the story. Claims such as “God is creator” are simply shorthand 
ways of reminding us that we believe we are participants in a much 
more elaborate story, of which God is the author. Doctrines, 
therefore, are not the upshot of the stories; they are not the mean-
ing or heart of the stories. Rather they are tools (sometimes even 
misleading tools), meant to help us tell the story better. Because 
the Christian story is an enacted story, liturgy is probably a much 
more important resource than are doctrines or creeds for helping 
us to hear, tell, and live the story of God.69 
 
The above should make us mindful once again of Whitehead’s 
caution concerning “the fallacy of misplaced concreteness.” While the 
excavation spoken of above70 might at first blush seem simply an at-
tempt to, in Whitehead’s words, “recur to the concrete in search of 
                                               
67 As cited in Howard Snyder, Liberating the Church: The Ecology of Church and 
Kingdom (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1983), 196. 
68 Hauerwas, Peaceable Kingdom, 26. 
69 Hauerwas, Peaceable Kingdom, 25–26. 
70 E.g., searching for the historical Jesus, analyzing texts using form-criticism, 
speculating as to the nature and content of Q, synthesizing and molding the above 
concepts into elegant (or at least provocative) doctrines pertaining to the nature and 
work of God, etc. While these activities certainly have their place, the argument here 
is against their pre-eminence—their being treated as concrete and ultimate. 
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inspiration,” it instead flirts dangerously with a “neglecting of the de-
gree of abstraction involved in thought when an actual entity is con-
sidered merely so far as it exemplifies certain categories of thought.” 
For in this case, instead of being some reified version of factual reality 
exhumed, the concrete happens to be the text itself—not the specula-
tive encrustation of biblical criticism surrounding it.71 
 
The important point to be emphasized, to theologians especially, 
is that this story, however enigmatic, is the true story, the only 
story Christians have to tell, and that it has no unstoried form. If 
it sometimes seems so incredible as to strain the imagination and 
offend the reason, the wise theologians will attempt no defense 
beyond a reminder (paraphrasing 1 Cor. 1:25) that the fictions of 
God are truer than the facts of men.72 
 
Unless we heed this counsel, Whitehead’s warned-against “categories 
of thought” will most likely end up being none other than the distinc-
tively Enlightenment influenced abstractions of “rationality” and “ob-
jective truth.” 
Finally, it is not merely to avoid corruption of the biblical text or 
to avert an abstraction of its contents that we celebrate the narrative 
form of the Scriptures. It is also owing to the narrative nature of the 
world itself and our place in it. Based upon the conviction that life is 
constantly lived out narratively, I will examine in the next article a bib-
                                               
71 Literary critic Northrup Frye argues that when idolatry is discussed within 
Scripture, it “is often regarded as a ‘literal’ projection into the external world of an 
image that might be quite acceptable as a poetic metaphor” (The Great Code: The Bible 
and Literature [San Diego: Harcourt Brace, 1982], 61). What we have here is the reifi-
cation of narrative device as the essence of idolatry. Daly and Cobb, after character-
izing idolatry as the act of “formally … treating as ultimate or whole that which is 
not ultimate or whole,” go on to underscore the degree of correspondence this has 
with Whitehead’s concept. As they say, “everyone commits the fallacy of misplaced 
concreteness. All of us are idolators [sic]” (For the Common Good, 389). 
72 Garrett Green as cited in Brueggemann, Finally Comes the Poet, 5–6. 
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lical hermeneutical methodology which takes seriously the literary na-
ture of the Bible. In turn, the third article in this series will represent 
an attempt to apply this to a selected cultural scene. For the latter pro-
cess to be viable, that is, for any utilization of a biblical hermeneutical 
methodology dependent upon the narrative nature of the Scriptures to 
bear fruit when applied to a real-life cultural scene, it stands to reason 
that the personal appropriation of the concept of narrative will have to 
have meaning for us. But for this to happen Christianly, the narrative 
quality of the Scriptures must first be seen as being of consequence. 
However, if the narrative timber of the Bible is deemed irrelevant then 
our hermeneutic will be rendered useless, not only in relation to inter-
preting the text but also as it relates to our own contexts. This is due 
to the contingent nature of our story in relation to the story of God. 
Hauerwas explains, 
 
we are provided with a truthful account of reality that enables us 
to see our life as more than a succession of events when we learn 
to locate our story in God’s story. That does not mean our life has 
a singular goal or meaning; rather, the story of God we learn 
through Christ gives us the skills to go on even when no clear goal 
is present. We rightly seek neither happiness nor pleasure in them-
selves; such entities are elusive. Rather we learn happiness and 
pleasure when we find in a faithful narrative an ongoing and wor-
thy task that is able to sustain our lives.73 
 
Hence, for the Christian, not only reality with a small “r”—objective, 
detached, impersonal truth (the normal focus of hermeneutics)—but 
also reality with a capital “R”—our personal, lived-out, everyday expe-
riences (what might be called existential interpretation)—finds its ulti-
mate significance in the story of God. Life now comes clothed in 
meaning by way of personal embrace. And of course, meaning not em-
braced is ultimately no meaning at all. 
                                               
73 Hauerwas, Peaceable Kingdom, 68. 
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The Narrative Nature of Anthropological Truth  
 
I have already pointed to the emerging concept of “society as text” as 
found in the social sciences at-large. But what about anthropology—
the field which I have chosen to look at in this series of articles? Is this 
discipline compatible with such an understanding? 
While there certainly are dissenters, more and more anthropolo-
gists are now taking a hermeneutical approach to cultural analysis seri-
ously. They are realizing that, quite frequently, “complex concepts 
elude current investigative [anthropological] techniques; and, at least 
for a while, more interest and importance may be learned through ap-
proaches informed by literary sensibility.”74 Thus, Gardner points out, 
“There has been at least a partial return to the view that anthropology 
ought to re-embrace the holistic methods of the in-depth case study, 
and perhaps align itself more with the humanities and less with the 
sciences.”75 Bellah seems to agree with this in respect to the social sci-
ences as a whole, especially given the importance of the notion of 
story, as we saw above. 
 
[W]hat we need from history, and why the social scientist must 
also, among other things, be a historian, is not merely comparable 
information about the past, but some idea of how we have gotten 
from the past to the present, in short, a narrative. Narrative is a 
primary and powerful way by which to know about a whole. In an 
important sense, what a society (or a person) is, is its history. So a 
Habermas or a MacIntyre gives us his story about how modern 
society came to its present pass. Such stories can, and must, be 
contested, amended, and sometimes replaced.76 
 
                                               
74 Howard Gardner, The Mind’s New Science: A History of the Cognitive Revolution 
(New York: Basic Books, 1985), 358. 
75 Gardner, The Mind’s New Science, 226. 
76 Bellah, Habits of the Heart, 302. 
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And with this has arisen a school of thought within the discipline 
known as symbolic anthropology. While at once embracing a wide and var-
ied spectrum of views and theories, this way of thinking, overall, lays 
greater stress upon communication of purpose and symbolic mean-
ing.77 It shares much in common with the project in the field of cy-
bernetics known as semiotics, “the science of signs and sign-using be-
havior.”78 And we are already acquainted with the anthropologist most 
normally associated with this approach: none other than Clifford 
Geertz himself.79 For it is Geertz who frequently calls for a literary 
view of anthropology. He says,  
 
Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in 
webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those 
webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental sci-
ence in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning.80 
 
And since there are many who have joined his program, 
 
the casting of social theory in terms more familiar to gamesters 
and aestheticians than to plumbers and engineers is clearly well 
under way. The recourse to the humanities for explanatory analo-
gies in the social sciences is at once evidence of the destabilization 
of genres and of the rise of the “interpretive turn,” and their most 
visible outcome is a revised style of discourse in social studies. The 
instruments of reasoning are changing and society is less and less 
represented as an elaborate machine or a quasi-organism and 
more as a serious game, a sidewalk drama, or a behavioral text.81 
                                               
77 Seymour-Smith, Macmillan Dictionary of Anthropology, 273. 
78 Seymour-Smith, Macmillan Dictionary of Anthropology, 255. 
79 Cf. Gardner, The Mind's New Science, 243–44, 250, 355–59. 
80 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 5. 
81 Geertz, Local Knowledge, 22–23. 
Construing Culture as Composition—Part 1 | 39 
As a natural outworking of the above, Geertz readily (and, for us, not 
surprisingly) looks to Paul Ricoeur for insight into the ethnographic 
task. He cites Ricoeur’s concept of “inscription,” a fixation of meaning 
in “some established recording process,” which gives opportunity for 
the interpretive enterprise. Hence, doing ethnography assists the an-
thropologist to train her hermeneutical eye upon the symbols in ques-
tion—it functions as “the key to the transition from text to text ana-
logue, from writing as discourse to action as discourse.”82  Ethno-
graphic activity thus serves as the inscription of social discourse—the 
fixation of meaning which allows for interpretation.83 
 
The great virtue of the extension of the notion of text beyond 
things written on paper or carved into stone is that it trains atten-
tion on precisely this phenomenon: on how the inscription of ac-
tion is brought about, what its vehicles are and how they work, 
and on what the fixation of meaning from the flow of events—
history from what happened, thought from thinking, culture from 
behavior—implies for sociological interpretation. To see social in-
stitutions and social changes as in some sense “readable” is to alter 
our whole sense of what such interpretation is and shift it toward 
modes of thought rather more familiar to the translator, the exe-
gete, or the iconographer than to the test giver, the factor analyst, 
or the pollster.84 
 
However, the issue is not as simple as all that. For, the procedure 
now being cast in hermeneutical terms can once again be easily infected 
by that very malady we attempted to stave off earlier: thorough-going 
(individualized or communal) relativism. Geertz makes mention of this 
                                               
82 Geertz, Local Knowledge, 31. 
83 Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures, 19. 
84 Geertz, Local Knowledge, 31. 
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risk as well as its engendering cause: the lack of a suitable hermeneuti-
cal methodology.85 
 
The besetting sin of interpretive approaches to anything—litera-
ture, dreams, culture—is that they tend to resist, or to be permit-
ted to resist, conceptual articulation and thus to escape systematic 
modes of assessment. You either grasp an interpretation or you 
do not, see the point of it or you do not, accept it or you do not. 
Imprisoned in the immediacy of its own detail, it is presented as 
self-validating, or, worse, as validated by the supposedly devel-
oped sensitivities of the person who presents it; any attempt to 
cast what it says in terms other than its own is regarded as a trav-
esty—as, the anthropologist’s severest term of moral abuse, eth-
nocentric.86 
 
Buttressed by Ricoeur’s hermeneutical dialectic previously examined, I 
will attempt, in articles following this one, to deal with this problem. 
By utilizing Robert Traina’s hermeneutical methodology, it is hoped an 
interpretive program which can provide an ample amount of concep-
tual articulation and systematic modes of assessment can be formu-
lated. By then applying it to a cultural scene I hope to show that the 
conceptual bridge between hermeneutics in the social sciences and her-
meneutics in biblical studies need no longer be traversed in simply one 
direction. 
 
The Interpretive Process Examined 
 
To hammer out an operative methodology for cultural hermeneutics it 
will be helpful for us to recognize that human beings exhibit a far 
                                               
85 It should come as no surprise that this is the same complication one also 
finds when engaged in interpretation of the scriptures. 
86 Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures, 24. 
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greater degree of cognitive similarity than difference. As anthropolo-
gist Colin Turnbull has noted, “despite the outward appearance of al-
most irreconcilable difference between the way we and others do the 
same things, there is often much more similarity than might first have 
been supposed.”87 If these similarities—what some anthropologists 
call “world view universals”—could be isolated,88 we could then hang 
our interpretive endeavors upon something far more credible than a 
mere thin-air approach. Put more simply, with an over-all idea as to 
how the human mind sorts and categorizes, we might “establish a 
framework with which we can describe and compare world views. The 
basic requirement of this framework is that it be applicable to any hu-
man world view without greatly distorting it. It is in this sense analo-
gous to the diagnostic categories of doctors.”89 
Along with others in the cognitive sciences, Gestalt psychologists 
offer something akin to just such a framework. After having “exam-
ined a whole raft of ‘form qualities,’ whose phenomenal appearance 
could be explained in terms of analogous brain processes” they then 
 
put forth laws purporting to explain how perception is organized. 
For instance, they showed that objects that are close together tend 
to be grouped together (the law of proximity); the more symmetrical 
a closed region, the more it tends to be seen as a figure (the law of 
symmetry); and the arrangement of figure and ground seen is the 
one featuring the fewest changes or interruption in straight or 
smoothly curved lines (the law of good continuation)…. Though usu-
ally referring initially to visual demonstrations, versions of these 
                                               
87 Colin M. Turnbull, The Human Cycle (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), 
17. 
88 It must be admitted that isolating world view universals in any indisputable 
fashion is not the goal of this essay, since asserting what those might look like would 
be nothing more than a highly contentious claim. The good news is, we are in no 
need of doing that here—instead, all we need do is identify a collection of likely, 
would-be postulates in order that we might illustrate my primary thesis, namely, that 
around something like these a robust interpretive model can be rooted. 
89 Michael Kearney, World View (Novato, CA: Chandler & Sharp, 1984), 65. 
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laws also applied to auditory sequences—for example, rhythmic 
patterns.90 
 
In each of the chosen methodologies that follow we will witness an 
amazing affinity to these Gestalt groupings. A similar collection of 
“structural relationships” will ultimately be at the heart of what I offer 
as my own general interpretive methodology. 
However, a caution is in order here. Even though the hermeneu-
tical technique from anthropology examined below—a procedure 
known as the Developmental Research Sequence Method—derives from 
James P. Spradley, one of the key leaders in the cultural idealist branch 
of anthropology known as ethnosemantics, utilization of his categories 
certainly does not ipso facto lock us into his cultural idealist approach 
to anthropology. My utilization of his assortment of interpretive axi-
oms—or, as he calls them, semantic relationships—is due far more to the 
similarity these share with Traina’s structural relationships—whose 
ideas, once again, I will utilize in the third article in this series—than 
to any a priori spin on how anthropology must be done.91 It is surely 
clear that my preference is for a Geertzian “text analogue” form of 
symbolic anthropology—where “culture is likened to a text or lan-
guage.”92 But this does not preclude the possibility of others using the 
constructs I am promoting in a manner contrary to that presented. The 
reason for this, of course, is that Spradley’s semantic relationships are 
broad, analytical patterns of logic not in themselves presupposing any 
specific content or meaning. Even the self-styled historical materialist 
Michael Kearney acknowledges that, alongside the content of a per-
son’s world view, “the description of which is the basic empirical eth-
nographic task,” there is also “the structure—the basic categories of 
                                               
90 Gardner, The Mind’s New Science, 112, emphasis added. 
91 Cf. James P. Spradley and David W. McCurdy, Anthropology: The Cultural Per-
spective, 2nd ed. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1980), 360–61 and James P. Spradley, 
The Ethnographic Interview (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979), 107–12. 
92 Appleby, Hunt, and Jacob, Telling the Truth About History, 224. 
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thought—which it has in common with all human world views.”93     
I am simply suggesting that something like Spradley’s (or, ultimately, 
Traina’s) groupings be taken as the basic components in that universal 
structure.94 
 
                                               
93  Kearney, World View, 3. By employing the expression “categories of 
thought” echoes Kant who, in the tradition of Aristotle, took these “elementary con-
cepts of the pure understanding—such as quantity (unity, plurality, and totality); quality 
(reality, negation, and limitation); relation (substance and accident, cause-and-effect, 
and reciprocity); modality (possibility, existence, and necessity)—[to] constitute the 
mental equipment, the pure synthesizing concepts with which human understanding 
is endowed. These alone allow the individual to make sense of his experiences” 
(Gardner, The Mind’s New Science, 58). 
Cognitive linguist Steven Pinker says, “The universal plan underlying languages, 
with auxiliaries and inversion rules, nouns and verbs, subjects and objects, phrases 
and clauses, case and agreement, and so on, seems to suggest a commonality in the 
brains of speakers, because many other plans would have been just as useful. It is as 
if isolated inventors miraculously came up with identical standards for typewriter 
keyboards or Morse code or traffic signals” (The Language Instinct: How the Mind Creates 
Language [New York: William Morrow, 1994], 43). It always piques the interest of the 
theist when a person such as Pinker—probably an agnostic evolutionist at best—
essays to explain the agent of a “miraculously” appearing universal characteristic by 
personifying it. I, for one, invariably find myself asking, “At what (or at whom) is he 
pointing?” 
94 Kearney echoes a dilemma about which I am keenly aware: “With respect to 
. . . universals, two issues persist: whether or not they are the most appropriate cate-
gories for describing, analyzing, and comparing world views, and whether or not they 
are truly universal. It is possible that these questions cannot be resolved absolutely. 
This indefiniteness results from an unavoidable relativism inherent in the selection 
of the world-view universals. Any attempt at world-view study can utilize only cate-
gories that are historically available to it at the time of analysis. At different periods, 
different choices are possible” (World View, 207–8). It must be remembered that, 
even though I will propose (or more accurately, borrow from Traina) my own list, 
the goal in these articles is not to isolate a definitive inventory of universal herme-
neutical categories of thought. I am simply attempting here to illustrate the feasibility 
of applying a biblical hermeneutical methodology to a cultural scene. The fact that 
“at different periods [and in different places], different choices are possible” simply 
points to the need for the safeguard already called for above: an ongoing intra- and 
inter-community hermeneutical dialogue. With this, the appropriateness and actual 
existence of any proposed group of categories (including Traina’s that I will essay to 
use) can be weighed and tested against that truly experienced by a wide variety of 
individuals and communities. 
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An Example from Anthropology—Spradley’s 
Developmental Research Sequence Method 
 
While identifying semantic relationships is an integral step in the eth-
nographic procedure James Spradley labels the Developmental Research 
Sequence Method, this is certainly not its only aim.95 In fact, the cycle can 
be broken down into two somewhat overlapping steps: (1) identifying 
and analyzing cultural domains, which then serve as matrices for (2) 
identifying and analyzing cultural themes.96 Central to this two-step 
process is the utilization of interpretive questions to plumb the depths 
of the domains and themes. Not coincidentally, identifying questions 
germane to the hermeneutical enterprise will also prove to be the chief 
objective of the general interpretive methodology I will offer in the 
two artciles that follow. In fact, all three of these elements—cultural 
domains, cultural themes, and interpretive questions—will hold signif-
icant sway there. Thus, it should now be helpful for us to look at these 
three facets one by one. 
 
Cultural Domains 
 
Spradley makes it clear that 
 
any symbolic category that includes other categories is a domain. 
All the members of a domain share at least one feature of mean-
ing. In the process of discovering domains we will look especially 
for the similarities that exist among folk terms. Domains are the 
first and most important unit of analysis in ethnographic re-
search.97 
 
                                               
95 Spradley, Ethnographic Interview, 41–204; Spradley and McCurdy, Anthropology, 
355–69. 
96 Spradley, Ethnographic Interview, 94. 
97 Spradley, Ethnographic Interview, 100. 
Construing Culture as Composition—Part 1 | 45 
He then continues by listing four features of every cultural domain.98 
 First, every domain can be categorized by means of a cover term. 
As the expression implies, this classification points to any category 
which itself embraces many other terms and concepts, with the possi-
bility that these too might function as cover terms for yet smaller do-
mains. Hence, within domains one frequently finds domains. Which 
of these finally become the object of study simply depends upon one’s 
focus. 
Second, as already suggested, “all domains have two or more in-
cluded terms. These are folk terms that belong to the category of 
knowledge named by the cover term.”99 Again, from a different angle, 
these included terms may themselves function as cover terms. 
Third, all domains exhibit a collection of semantic relationships. 
“When two folk categories are linked together, we refer to this link as 
a semantic relationship.”100 We should be especially mindful not to 
confuse semantic relationships with cultural themes—a concept we 
will examine rather closely in the third article of this series. The former 
refers to the way ideas and artifacts relate one to another whereas the 
latter refer to a general meaning or idea implied by the existence of 
these relationships. Domains are the fruit of observation and interpre-
tation (Erklären); themes, the fruit of unfolding comprehension proper 
(Verstehen) based upon observation demarcated by domains. In other 
words, while cultural themes are distinguished by taking note of and 
interpreting semantic relationships within domains, the two are not 
identical. 
Finally, domains are always delineated by means of boundaries, with 
“some folk terms belong inside the domain and others belong outside 
the domain.”101 Consequently, domains can be and are isolated from 
one another. 
                                               
98 Spradley, Ethnographic Interview, 101–2. 
99 Spradley, Ethnographic Interview, 100. 
100 Spradley, Ethnographic Interview, 100. 
101 Spradley, Ethnographic Interview, 101. 
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Spradley and McCurdy state that one of the best ways to identify 
cultural domains is by means of trying to locate cover terms. Further-
more, “a helpful way to find cover terms is to recognize the semantic 
relationships that organize a domain.” 102  Hence, as already stated 
above, identifying semantic relationships serves as a fundamental step 
in the Developmental Research Sequence Method. Citing several studies in 
which “investigators have proposed similar types of semantic relation-
ships,”103 these two gentlemen offer a list of “universal semantic rela-
tionships” as an aid to isolating cultural domains.104 
 
1. Strict inclusion  X is a kind of Y 
2. Spatial   X is a place in Y, X is a part of Y 
3. Cause-effect  X is a result of Y, X is a cause of Y 
4. Rationale  X is a reason for doing Y 
5. Location for action X is a place for doing Y 
6. Function  X is used for Y 
7. Means-end  X is a way to do Y 
8. Sequence  X is a step (stage) in Y 
9. Attribution  X is an attribute (characteristic) of Y 
 
Looking curiously like the Gestalt groupings commented upon above, 
this list provides an example of what universal hermeneutical con-
structs might look like. Spradley himself realizes that “the ethnog-
rapher can take any proposed list of universal relationships and use 
                                               
102 Spradley and McCurdy, Anthropology, 360. 
103 Spradley, Ethnographic Interview, 109. 
104 Spradley, Ethnographic Interview, 111; Spradley and McCurdy, Anthropology, 
361. Slight differences are evident when the lists in these two cited publications are 
compared. Spradley’s list contains nine relationships as opposed to the eight that 
appear in Spradley and McCurdy (the category Attribution does not appear in the 
latter). In addition, the nomenclature utilized in each is somewhat different. The 
point I am making here, however, is simply that these types of universal groupings 
are widely thought to exist. Once again, in the next article in this series I will make 
use of a different collection (those borrowed from Traina) for identifying a general 
interpretive methodology. 
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them to search for domains.”105 Most important for our purposes is 
the fact that, by utilizing relationships akin to these, the conceptual 
articulation Geertz deplores as so often lacking in interpretive ap-
proaches to culture can in this way be supplied. In my attempt to offer 
such in my next article, I will lean rather heavily upon a grouping quite 
like Spradley’s.106 
 
Cultural Themes 
 
The concept of cultural themes was first advanced by anthropologist 
Morris Opler when he claimed, “a limited number of dynamic affirma-
tions … can be identified in every culture and that the key to the char-
acter, structure, and direction of the specific culture is to be sought in 
the nature, expression, and interrelationship of these themes.”107 Oth-
ers have since acknowledged the existence of such axioms.108 Michael 
Kearney sees E. Adamson Hoebel’s postulates of the Cheyenne culture, 
Francis L. K. Hsu’s contrasting postulates concerning the cultures of 
China and the United States, and George Foster’s concept of Image of 
Limited Good as being like Opler’s.109 In fact, in work centering upon 
the Mexican village of Ixtepeji, Kearney himself “also derived a set of 
interrelated propositions that organize sociocultural behavior and be-
liefs.”110 He gives to all of these similar constructs the designation 
logico-structural integration: “It is in this study of Ixtepeji, in Opler’s dis-
cussion of how themes balance one another, in Hoebel’s corollaries, 
and in Foster’s ‘cognitive orientations’ … that we can see a suggestion 
                                               
105 Spradley, Ethnographic Interview, 110–11. 
106 It will later be evident that the list I propose, borrowed from Traina, more 
closely parallels the Gestalt listing than it does the list put forward by Spradley. 
107 Morris E. Opler, “Themes as Dynamic Forces in Culture,” American Journal 
of Sociology 51 (1945): 198–206, 198. 
108 As representatives here, cf. Spradley, Ethnographic Interview, 18; Kearney, 
World View, 30, 62; and Seymour-Smith, Macmillan Dictionary of Anthropology, 65. 
109 Kearney, World View, 30–31. 
110 Kearney, World View, 30. 
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of what I refer to . . . as logico-structural integration.”111 But regardless of 
nomenclature, one strand remains constant throughout: a shared, inte-
grating premise or group of premises embraced by a people which re-
sound(s) repeatedly throughout their world view concerning a certain 
aspect of life lived out individually or together. 
Moreover, for the purpose at hand a more interesting feature 
stands out. Returning to Opler’s original term, if we seek dictionary 
definitions most relevant to our use of the term theme, what we find 
encompasses “the subject of a talk, piece of writing, exhibition, etc.; a 
topic” as well as “an idea that recurs in or pervades a work of art or 
literature.”112 
The connection to the notion of narrative here is obvious. The 
definition suggests that synonyms for the term theme could quite easily 
be a piece of writing, subject, or topic, each bearing a literary or aes-
thetic connotation by way of its recurring appearance. In like manner, 
Opler, in the portion of his article cited above, refers to “the character, 
structure, and direction of the specific culture,” as if pointing to a piece 
of literature in need of review. 
Hence, the resemblance to Geertz’s literary spin on culture is not 
difficult to discern. It appears that as we take note of and interpret 
semantic relationships within domains, we are brought closer and 
closer to comprehending those domains’ themes as they function com-
parable to literary leitmotifs whereupon culture as text analogue should 
begin to bear fruit in understanding. 
 
Interpretive Questions 
 
Any parent can attest to the power of the question. Even though chil-
dren have a limited range of psycho-linguistic capabilities allowing 
them to verbalize their intended meaning, they are sufficiently 
equipped at least by age three to begin using questions as a meaning-
                                               
111 Kearney, World View, 30–31, cf. 123–45. 
112 http://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/theme. 
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seeking device—and often to the point of driving parents mad! But is 
it any wonder that when humans are at this stage of unprecedented 
personal growth and development (ages 0–5) the medium most fre-
quently called upon just so happens to be this ever so puissant one? 
For, as was alluded to above, strategically broached questions provide 
the key to the hermeneutical process, or the “making-sense-of-the-
world” process. 
However, the preferred procedure here is not some superficial, 
rapid-fire discharging of any old set of questions (something a belea-
guered parent often feels is happening when caught face-to-face with 
an inquisitive three-year old.) In attempting to get at the meaning of 
someone else’s world view, questions must be posed which take seri-
ously those beliefs and categories accepted by first-hand participants 
in the context in question. This is even more so for the ethnographer. 
 
It could be said of ethnography that until you know the question 
that someone in the culture is responding to you can’t know many 
things about the responses. Yet the ethnographer is greeted, in the 
field, with an array of responses. He needs to know what question 
people are answering in their every act. He needs to know which 
questions are being taken for granted because they are what “eve-
rybody knows” without thinking…. Thus the task of the ethnog-
rapher is to discover questions that seek the relationship among 
entities that are conceptually meaningful to the people under in-
vestigation.113 
 
Development theorist Robert Chambers echoes this same sentiment 
as it relates to that most question-oriented of all devices: the survey 
questionnaire. 
 
Unless careful appraisal precedes drawing up a questionnaire, the 
survey will embody the concepts and categories of outsiders rather 
                                               
113 Black and Metzger as cited in Spradley, Ethnographic Interview, 84. 
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than those of rural people, and thus impose meanings on the social 
reality. The misfit between the concepts of urban professionals and 
those of poor rural people is likely to be substantial, and the ques-
tions asked may construct artificial chunks of ‘knowledge’ which 
distort or mutilate the reality which poor people experience.114 
 
Hence, a battery of inductively-discovered, strategically-framed questions 
can serve as the ideal underpinning for the entire ethnographic process. 
Spradley agrees with all of this when he underscores that “the eth-
nographer’s main tools for discovering another person’s cultural 
knowledge is the ethnographic question.”115 In his Developmental Re-
search Sequence Method he lists three main types of ethnographic ques-
tions: descriptive, structural, and contrast.116 The first type attempts to 
“elicit a large sample of utterances in the informant’s language.”117 It 
essentially asks the What question (i.e., it solicits definitions). The sec-
ond variety, structural questions, are intimately tied to the make-up and 
arrangement of given domains. Hence, these seek to answer how in-
formation is organized on the part of informants—how their world 
“hooks and eyes” together. Finally, contrast questions, the third type, 
“enable the ethnographer to discover the dimensions of meaning 
which informants employ to distinguish the objects and events in their 
world.”118 Also, “the meaning of any folk term depends on what it does 
not mean. Whenever we use language we call attention to what things 
are; but we also call attention to what they are not.”119 Spradley believes 
that, armed with these three general types of questions, the ethnog-
                                               
114 Robert Chambers, Rural Development: Putting the Last First (London: Long-
man Scientific & Technical, 1983), 51. 
115 Spradley, Ethnographic Interview, 60. 
116 Spradley, Ethnographic Interview, 60, cf. 78–91, 120–31, 155–72. 
117 Spradley, Ethnographic Interview, 85. 
118 Spradley, Ethnographic Interview, 60. 
119 Spradley, Ethnographic Interview, 158, emphasis original. 
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rapher can attempt to analyze cultural domains, thereby arriving at cul-
tural themes which offer a window into the world view in question.120 
It is here, in discussing the use of ethnographic questions, that 
Spradley’s cultural idealist tendencies seem to me most evident. His 
questions appear entirely based upon verbal responses elicited from 
“informants.” Hence, there is an assumption commonly embraced in 
ethnosemantic circles that “the naming of things is an important indi-
cator of cognition” and, in fact, that cognitive mapping functions as 
the causal element in all indigenous world view fashioning.121 This be-
ing the case, the goal is to get the informant to talk about his or her 
situation and then, based upon answers given during interviewing, re-
construct a rationalized, ideal model of the informant’s perceived pic-
ture of reality. 
Historical and cultural materialists have challenged this mental 
model of cognition on the premise that it does not take into consider-
ation the impact a person’s material surroundings and its accompany-
ing vicissitudes can (and, they say, will!) have upon the world view em-
braced.122 Consequently, with this feedback ignored, mere mental cat-
egories can easily become reified due to an over reliance upon a theory 
concerning cognition which historical materialists say is overly influ-
enced by structuralist linguistics.123 
                                               
120 As has already been stated, Spradley lists these categories as his three main 
groupings of questions. Each grouping encompasses its own collection of types and 
subtypes (cf. Ethnographic Interview, 85–91, 126–31, 160–72). Thus, it would certainly 
be erroneous to give the impression that he recommends the use of only these three 
varieties of questions. 
121 Kearney, World View, 32. Without denying that cultural participants influ-
ence the ongoing formation of culture, framing it this way makes it sound as if a 
world view is something consciously tailored by cultural participants—analogous to 
a favorite set of clothes worn. Of course, this neglects the fact that world views are: 
first, tacitly operative and thus not consciously chosen at all; second, significantly 
shaped by external factors and not simply internally arranged. This last point, as we 
are about to see, is the primary assertion of historical and cultural materialists. 
122 E.g., Kearney, World View; Marvin Harris, Cultural Materialism: The Struggle 
for a Science of Culture (New York: Random House, 1979). 
123 Kearney, World View, 33–34. 
52  | The Journal of Inductive Biblical Studies 6/1:7-54 (Winter 2019) 
In a following article, in order that I might have opportunity for 
illustrating the viability of Traina’s hermeneutical model when applied 
to a cultural scene, I, too, will concern myself primarily with infor-
mation provided by informants elicited by questions. However, these 
types of questions are quite different from those we will later classify 
as interpretive questions (adopting Traina’s terminology). The latter 
are employed in the interpretive process which best fits in the second 
phase of Ricoeur’s three-phase hermeneutical dialectic, what was called 
Erklären above, (i.e., that phase of interpretive honing which serves as 
a moment of testing and structuring one’s initial guess).124 In contrast, 
Spradley’s compendium of questions more appropriately serve to poise 
the interpreter for the “naïve grasp” phase—that point of preliminary 
understanding functioning as a guess about the whole.125 Of course, 
we too will venture a guess as to which unique structural relationships 
are found operative, thus making our attempts ostensibly like Spra-
dley’s array above.126 The difference, however, is that our interpretive 
variety is directly affixed to specific structural relationships identified 
at the time of the intuitive hunch (only Spradley’s structural questions 
seem to display a similar tethering—and then only in relation to in-
formants’ verbal responses).127 Being thus employed differently than 
Spradley’s semantic relationships, these structural relationships are not 
as critically reliant upon verbal responses from informants. Instead, 
                                               
124 This occurs after the ethnographer interviews or engages in participant ob-
servation and the semantic or structural relationships are tentatively isolated. 
125 In contrast to those mentioned earlier, these are the questions posed during 
interviewing or participant observation. These are very like what Traina calls observa-
tional questions. They do not ask the meaning of something, instead they inquire as to 
presence or existence. 
126 In Traina’s methodology as I experienced it, he also put forward three over-
arching categories of questions; namely, the definitive, the rational, and the implica-
tional. However, the nature of these, as we shall see, are quite different from Spra-
dley’s variety. In addition, the sequentially progressive relationship existing between 
these three types of questions—which I will give attention to below—also seems to 
be unique to Traina. All of this will become more obvious in our forthcoming dis-
cussion. 
127 This design element will be more evident once explained and illustrated in 
our subsequent analysis. 
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they might just as easily present themselves straightaway by means of 
non-mediated community involvement.128 This is due to the fact that 
their engendering methodology. originally designed with the biblical 
text in mind, is more intentionally literary and aesthetically-oriented 
and thus better equipped to handle non-verbal as well as extra-verbal 
cultural events.129 In short, it is more in keeping with Geertz’s text 
analogue approach. The methodology suggested in this series of arti-
cles exploits the advantages of this sort of approach as over and against 
other methods, such as the method of Spradley, not particularly ger-
mane to a narrative understanding of culture. 
 
Conclusion to Part 1:  
The Narrative Nature of Truth 
 
This look at Spradley’s Developmental Research Sequence Method has assisted 
us in several ways. First, we have seen that his approach is based upon 
(1) identifying universal semantic relationships by means of (2) accom-
panying ethnographic questions to (3) isolate cultural themes useful for 
constructing a world view model. This method and its three resulting 
movements are very like what we will see in the next article when we 
                                               
128 To be fair to Spradley, his Developmental Research Sequence Method above has 
been taken exclusively from his book entitled The Ethnographic Interview (1979). Hence, 
it only stands to reason that he would focus upon interviewing and informants there. 
However, as a glance at one of his other works makes clear, his is still a (conspicu-
ously) cultural idealist approach, see Participant Observation (New York: Holt, Rinehart 
& Winston, 1980). Hence, what appears overtly in his methodology of ethnographic 
interviewing also asserts itself in his other works. 
129 In fact, as we will see as we delve deeper into this discussion, the shape and 
content of Traina’s structural relationships were greatly influenced by the English 
writer, art critic, and reformer John Ruskin and what has come to be called his Essay 
on Composition, a tract taken from “the latter half of Letter Three in his Elements of 
Drawing, published in 1857” (Howard T. Kuist, Scripture and the Christian Response 
[Richmond: John Knox, 1947], 160). Hence, Traina’s constructs find their source in 
writings initially focused upon artistic composition. 
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more closely examine Traina’s methodology. Hence, the affinity be-
tween hermeneutics in anthropology and hermeneutics in biblical stud-
ies has been underscored once again. 
Second, the now widely-accepted search for cultural themes evi-
dent in much of anthropology points us to a methodological modus 
operandi: theme identification in a culture patterned after the way a 
literary critic searches for leitmotifs in a story. Hence, Geertz’s call for 
a “recourse to the humanities for explanatory analogies in the social 
sciences” also rings true.130 
Third, given that the Gestalt groupings of cognitive universals as 
well as Spradley’s (and McCurdy’s) universal semantic relationships 
both bear a striking resemblance to Traina’s structural relationships, 
and given that Traina’s methodology promises to provide the concep-
tual articulation so sorely needed (and so often lacking) in interpretive 
approaches to culture, the way is now cleared for us to endorse the use 
of Traina’s structural relationships in the analysis of a cultural scene. 
In fact, with culture understood as text analogue, appropriation of 
Traina’s method seems an obvious next step. First, however, we must 
know what this step entails. The next article in this series (Part 2) will 
take a closer look at Traina’s methodology, which should then poise us 
for the final installment where I will attempt to apply something like 
Traina’s hermeneutical method to a cultural scene. 
                                               
130 Cf. n. 87 above. 
